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SELLARSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON PERCEPTION  
AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT 
 
ABSTRACT. I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take 
seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying 
that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the 
traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood 
as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing 
that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars so 
famously criticizes it. I suggest an alternative transcendental reading, according to 
which there are two sides to the subject matter of perceptual judgments: The matter 
given in perception (sensation), and its form (intuition). I present an account of 
sensations and intuitions on which it is unproblematic to see sensations as what is given 
in perception: They are not intelligible independently of their role as the matter of 
intuitions, the content of which is accessible to us only in the context of a judgment. 
 
 
It seems plausible that something is given to us in perception that is the basis 
for the judgments we form about objects in view.1And it is tempting to say that 
what is given in perception has content in some way without being conceptual. 
It seems plausible, on the other hand, that only conceptually structured content 
is accessible to us. Approaches that assume perception to be providing us with 
(non-conceptual) content, which cannot be expressed in a judgment, play down 
or circumvent the second of these two suppositions. In contrast, many 
  
1 This paper has gone through several stages and I am indebted to many people for help. I thank 
Robert Brandom, Joseph Camp, Philip Catton, Rick Grush, Henry Pickford, Kevin Scharp, and 
Lionel Shapiro for helpful comments on an early draft of this paper and Willem deVries, Kieran 
Setiya, and Wayne Wu as well as audiences of meetings of the Joint Session of the Aristotelian 
Society and Mind Association in Belfast, the American Philosophical Association in Washington, 
the Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophy in Bielefeld, and the Canadian Philosophical 
Association in Halifax (all in 2003) for comments on a later version. I benefited from comments 
by Stephen Engstrom on the most recent version. Finally, I am indebted to Matt Boyle, Anil 
Gupta, and John McDowell for invigorating discussions and detailed comments on multiple drafts 
of this paper.  
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approaches that assume perception to be concept-dependent drop the first 
supposition, arguing that our perception of objects must be conceptual from 
the outset. 
Sellars is normally taken to be a radical supporter of the thesis that our 
perception does not involve a given (see most recently Alston 2002). I will 
argue, however, that a Sellarsian approach to perception allows one to take 
seriously the idea that perception is concept-dependent without denying that 
something is given to us in perception. My argument proceeds in two steps. 
First, I argue that the concepts that we employ in perceptual judgments are 
related to objects in that they involve rules of application specifying the 
circumstances under which it is correct to use a word and the practical 
consequences of its use. But taking application rules into account is, I will 
argue, not sufficient to explain what is involved in directing a thought at this 
rather than that particular object in perception. In a second step, I address this 
more specific question. I show that we can consider ourselves to be referring to 
objects, not by setting up atomistic semantical relations between expressions 
and objects, but by picking out particular objects in the context of a full-blown 
language. I argue for this second point by distinguishing two possible readings 
of Sellars’s interpretation of sensations (sinnliche Eindrücke) and Kantian 
intuitions (Anschauungen). On what could be called an empiricist reading, 
sensations are understood as the input on the basis of which we form basic 
conceptual representations, namely intuitions, and full-blown propositional 
representations. I argue that it is unclear on such a reading why sensations and 
intuitions are not the given as Sellars so famously criticizes it.  
This understanding of the sensible conditions of perception will be 
contrasted with what could be called a transcendental understanding of 
sensations and intuitions. On such a reading, intuitions and sensations are what 
we must assume figure in our perception if we think of our perception as 
having a subject matter. On Kant’s picture, there are two sides to the sensible 
conditions without which we cannot think of ourselves as having perception of 
objective reality: The matter given in perception (sensation) and its form 
(intuition). While intuitions are not graspable independently of being 
subsumed under concepts in the context of a judgment, sensations are not 
graspable independently of being formed into empirical intuitions. Although 
sensations can be seen as what is given in perception, they are intelligible only 
as the matter of intuitions, the content of which is intelligible only in the 
context of a judgment. 
The question of what it means to have perceptions of this rather than that 
particular object is approached by thinking through Kant’s understanding of 
intuitions and sensations because, I believe, we have much to learn from his 
insights in these matters. I see Kant as discussing the materials necessary for 
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the construction of a framework that leaves room for the suppositions 
motivating theories that assume the possibility of non-conceptual content, 
without thereby falling prey to a crude empiricist account of perception.2 
Thinking through Sellarsian and Kantian approaches to perception will serve 
as a springboard to bring out a way of making sense of the idea that something 
is given in perception that is not as yet conceptually structured. Thus, this 
paper meshes historical and systematic interests. 
For Kant the fundamental nature of empirical judgments is their 
dependence on receptive intuitions. This dependence on intuitions is an insight 
shared with the empiricist tradition. But in contrast to philosophers standing in 
that tradition, Kant sees the intelligibility of empirical intuitions as necessarily 
relying on a conceptual framework. Intuitions provide direct links to objects, 
but these links are not atomistic content-generating links, since we can only 
grasp the content of intuitions in the context of a judgment. Discussing these 
issues quickly leads to the question of how the relation between intuitions and 
demonstratives should be understood. In a third part, I will address this 
question by discussing Sellars’s interpretation of intuitions as having the form 
“that cube.” Again I will distinguish two possible readings of such a view. I 
argue that intuitions must not be understood as a separable contribution to 
perceptual judgments, but as providing for the possibility of such judgments.  
 
 
1. Functional Roles and Rules of Application 
 
The question of what it means to direct one’s thought at a particular object has 
a semantical as well as an epistemological dimension. From a semantical 
perspective, the question is how the content of our thoughts determines what 
the thoughts are about. From an epistemological perspective, the question 
takes the form of how our thoughts are affected and guided by the objects that 
they are about. Sellars approaches the problem of perceptual content from both 
angles. He criticizes ambitions to ground the contents of our expressions by 
way of atomistic content-generating links to objects and develops his positive 
account by arguing that the contents of our expressions must be understood in 
terms of the functional roles of these expressions. This view leads him to 
maintain that there are no direct semantical relations between words and 
objects and, thus, to a radical non-relational semantics. The same thoughts take 
  
2 The term ‘non-conceptual content’ is used rather differently in different accounts of perception. 
Throughout this paper, it will be understood as content that is accessible to the perceiving subject 
without bringing any conceptual capacities into play. 
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an epistemological twist when he argues against the possibility that sense data 
are given to us in perception as something that we know solely by 
acquaintance.  
The main difficulties with Sellars’s account are all connected to the 
question of how expressions can be seen as referring to particular objects in 
perception.3 To bring out the nature of the problem it will be necessary to lay 
out the basic semantical ideas that motivate Sellars’s account of perception. In 
“Being and Being Known,” Sellars argues that conceptual episodes “differ 
intrinsically qua acts in a way which systematically corresponds to what they 
are about, i.e., their subject-matter” (1960, p. 43). He insists, however, that this 
is not meant to imply that there are semantical relations between the 
conceptual and the real orders. He contends that our thoughts can stand in 
semantical relations only to elements in the conceptual order and argues in 
Science and Metaphysics that this “non-relational character of ‘meaning’ and 
‘aboutness’” is the “key to a correct understanding of the place of mind in 
nature” (1967a, p. ix). 
What does it mean to say that there are no semantical relations involved in 
perception? On what one could call a strict non-relational view, perception 
does not represent particular objects at all. Such a view is motivated by the 
idea that the perception of two indistinguishable objects is exactly the same. 
Martin Davies, for example, argues that if two objects are perceptually 
indistinguishable for a subject, then the perception of one has the very same 
content as the perception of the other (1997, p. 314).  
Such a strict non-relational view is counterintuitive: If the content of the 
perceptions of two indistinguishable objects is the same, neither perception 
seems to represent the particular object in view. Of course, it need not follow 
from such a view that perception does not represent the world. On Davies’s 
account “[o]ne way to see how perceptual content can be truth conditional, 
although not object-involving, is to take perceptual content to be existentially 
quantified content” (1997, p. 314). This is just to say that two perceivers 
visually confronted with two distinct, but indistinguishable pens on a table 
represent that there is an object of a particular type lying on an object of 
another particular type. But this still leaves the question of how we can think 
of ourselves as perceiving this rather than that object: When a person perceives 
a pen, she knows which pen she is looking at, namely the one in view. As 
P. F. Strawson argues convincingly in his discussion of the possibility of 
  
3 I thank Lionel Shapiro for long discussions that helped me see more clearly how to think about 
the questions addressed in this section.  
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massive reduplication in the first chapter of his Individuals (1959), knowledge 
about mind-independent objects depends upon perceptual representations of 
particular objects in the world. Such knowledge is not accounted for on the 
strict non-relational view: Perception only provides a perceiver with 
knowledge that there is a pen of a certain type lying on a table of a certain 
type. 
One possible way to account for our ability to perceptually refer to this 
rather than that particular object is to acknowledge that demonstrative 
elements figure in the content of perception. By involving the reference of a 
demonstrative element that is fixed by the context of the perception in which it 
occurs, one can take into account that one and the same demonstrative element 
refers to different particular objects in different contexts. In contrast to the 
strict non-relational view, such a non-relational view involving demonstratives 
finds a place for the representation of particular objects in perceptual content.4 
Sellars acknowledges that more needs to be in play than the functional 
roles that constitute conceptual content to account for the justificatory force of 
perceptual judgments and thus rejects a strict non-relational view (see for 
instance Sellars 1997, §32/pp. 68-71). The question is what more needs to be 
in play on a Sellarsian view and whether it suffices to account for how it is that 
we can refer to particular objects in perception while denying any semantical 
relations between words and objects.  
On Sellars’s view, there is an isomorphism between the conceptual and the 
real orders, without which knowledge of the physical world would be 
impossible. How can such an isomorphism come about if it does not involve 
semantical relations between the conceptual and the real orders? To give the 
same question a Kantian twist: how is it guaranteed that the conceptual order is 
not arbitrary and haphazard, but in some way constrained by the objects our 
thoughts are about?  
The clearest account of how Sellars understands the isomorphism between 
the two orders can be found in Science and Metaphysics. He argues there that 
“expressions are involved in semantical uniformities (actual or potential) with 
the appropriate extra-linguistic items” (1967a, I §59/p. 82). He is quick to add, 
however, that this does not suggest that such semantical uniformities involve 
relations between conceptual and non-conceptual items, arguing that there is a 
relation within the conceptual order holding between words and functional 
  
4 Tyler Burge (1991) can be seen as having a version of such a view. As John Campbell (2002) 
has pointed out, the question of course arises how the demonstrative element can provide the 
perceiving subject with knowledge of what the demonstrative term refers to. I will address this 
question in the next section. 
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roles, which he refers to as a relation of signification.5 Similarly, there is a 
relation in the real order between sign-designs and objects, which he refers to 
as a relation of picturing. Picturing-relations map configurations of words onto 
configurations of natural objects, where the link between the word and the 
object is understood to be a causal one. 
Sellars is led to such a non-relational semantics through his account of 
meaning-statements. In order to accommodate the different roles played in 
meaning-statements of the form  
 
(1) ‘dreieckig’ (in German) means ‘triangular’,  
 
one can distinguish shape-focused and meaning-focused quotations. While 
*dreieckig* picks out a sign-design, •triangular• picks out a certain conceptual 
role played by, for example, *dreieckig*. The words *dreieckig* and 
*triangular* are •triangular•s, which is simply to say that *dreieckig* plays 
the same functional role in German as *triangular* plays in English. While 
‘*dreieckig*’ refers to tokens of the sign design *dreieckig* without 
depending on an abstract entity, the shape, ‘•triangular•’ refers to the 
functional role •triangular• without depending on an abstract entity, which one 
might want to call the “meaning” of the expression. The crucial point is that all 
we need to interpret (1) is a notion of two expressions having the same sign-
design and a notion of two expressions having the same functional role. There 
is no third thing to which either of the two expressions flanking the semantic 
term ‘means’ refer that accounts for the fact that *dreieckig* and *triangular* 
have the same functional role. Thus, (1) is not a relational predication. By 
reformulating (1) as  
 




(2’) A *dreieckig* is a •triangular•. 
 
the sentence can be recognized more clearly as a sortal predication (or 
classification). The sortal ‘•triangular•’ classifies expressions that have the 
same functional role. Accordingly, the semantic verb ‘means’ in the earlier 
sentence no longer appears as denoting a semantical relation, but rather as 
expressing a functional classification.6 Sellars argues that if his reconstruction 
  
5 It is misleading to be speaking of signification-relations, since Sellars insists that they are not 
relations at all, but just classifications.  
6 In his very early papers (see, for example, Sellars 1950), Sellars makes a slightly different 
distinction between sign-designs and functional roles, arguing that the pragmatic quotes (star 
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of meaning-statements is correct, then “it follows at once that semantical 
statements of the Tarski-Carnap variety do not assert relations between 
linguistic and extra-linguistic items” (1967a, I §59/p. 82). If meaning-
statements express functional classifications rather than semantical relations 
between words and objects, the difference between expressions must, on 
Sellars’s view, be seen as a difference in their semantic roles, not as a 
difference in what they refer to, be it an abstract object or an object in the real 
order.7  
So, semantical relations holding between the conceptual and the real orders 
are avoided by splitting the assumed word-object relations into signifying 
relations on the one hand and picturing relations on the other. While the 
sentence 
 
Tokens of the word *dreieckig* picture triangles, 
 
means that the word *dreieckig* represents a triangle, the sentence 
 
Tokens of the word *dreieckig* signify •triangular•, 
 
means that the word *dreieckig* is functionally classified as a •triangle•. This 
just is to say that there is a language-language relation of signification and a 
world-world relation of picturing, but no semantical relation holding between 
the conceptual and the real orders. What connect the picturing-relation with the 
signification-relation are only the words that play a role in both relations.  
The question arises as to how much philosophical weight the picturing 
relations can carry. According to Sellars, picturing relations guarantee that the 
structure of configurations of objects is preserved in our language by 
establishing referential relations between words and objects. Picturing 
relations constitute the isomorphism between the picturing language and the 
pictured world through a causal link between words and objects. He does not, 
however, want such causal relations to figure as content-generating links. 
What leads Sellars to his strong non-relational claims is his view that sentences 
of the form “a *cat* is a •cat•” do not involve any direct atomistic content-
generating relations between *cat*s and cats. Avoiding such atomistic 
relations, however, does not conflict with seeing concepts as involving 
semantical relations insofar as they are related to objects through the rules of 
  
quotes) specify token classes of sign-designs, while the syntactical quotes specify functions in a 
language. Token classes are taken to be kinds of visual or auditory patterns that embody 
conceptual functions in historical languages. Thus *dreieckig* and *triangular* are two token-
classes of the metalinguistic function that the relevant sign-design plays. 
7 For the most elaborate presentations of this argument, see Sellars (1963a) and (1983). 
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application that specify the circumstances under which it is correct to use the 
relevant word and the practical consequences of its use. Such a view does not 
imply that functional roles depend on atomistic content-generating links, since 
the rules governing a word’s application are only intelligible in the context of 
semantical relations within the conceptual order and thus only graspable by 
someone who is already a proficient speaker of a language. The suggestion is 
that the functional role in virtue of which a *cat* is a •cat• is embedded in the 
real order because it involves rules governing the application of the word 
*cat*. What makes the sentence “a *cat* is a •cat•“ true is that *cat*s have the 
role played by *cat* in a speaker’s language. 
It seems that taking such application rules into account involves taking 
relations between words and objects into account. But Sellars denies that. 
There are at least two ways in which Sellars might respond to the suggestion 
that acknowledging the importance of application rules involves 
acknowledging semantical relations between language and objective reality. 
He might argue that although the sentence “a *cat* is a •cat•“ cannot be true 
unless *cat*s refer to actual cats, the sentence itself does not express such a 
hook-up. The sentence merely depends on picturing relations between the 
conceptual and the real order, which are what bring about application rules. In 
this sense, the rules governing *cat* include not only inference rules but also 
application rules. Such an argument, however, amounts to introducing a rigid 
distinction between the necessary conditions of the validity of a sentence and 
its content. It is arguable whether it makes sense to say that the necessary 
conditions of a sentence are not themselves expressed by the sentence. 
The closest Sellars gets to acknowledging semantical relations is in his 
discussion of semantical uniformities: 
 
[I]n the case of expressions which stand for senses which are intensions, it will 
also be true (and necessarily so) that these expressions are involved in 
semantical uniformities (actual or potential) with the appropriate extra-linguistic 
items. Thus in order for it to be true that . . .  
 ‘Dreieckig’s (in German) are •triangular•s  
German ‘Dreieckig’s must participate in uniformities with triangular things, 
uniformities which parallel those involving our word ‘triangular’. But this does 
not mean that these statements themselves have the form 
   (Linguistic item) R (non-linguistic item). 
(1967a, III §59/p. 82; similarly IV §55ff./pp. 111ff.) 
 
But even semantical uniformities can be understood without appeal to 
semantical relations between words and objects, if they are understood as 
picturing relations, that is, as relations between a word, say *cat*, considered 
as an object in the real order, and other objects in the real order, namely actual 
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cats.8 In this sense, even the quoted passage can be read as expressing Sellars’s 
official line of thought, according to which an account of the content of our 
thoughts need not be made to depend on semantical relations between words 
and objects.9  
This argument, however, relies on uniformities already being established in 
our language. Nothing has been said about what brings about these 
uniformities in the first place. Sellars’s idea is that the uniformity of our 
linguistic behavior establishes picturing relations between words and objects 
and thereby secures that our language preserves the structure of the real order. 
The crucial point of Sellars’s argument is that the picturing relations are only 
linked to the signification relations in that our expressions play a role in both 
relations. This allows him to write that “the causal aspect of perceptual 
takings . . . accounts for the selecting of one world story rather than another 
and connects the ‘is’ of this selecting with the rule-governed or ‘ought to be’ 
character of the language” (1979, p. 110). An obvious line on which to 
criticize Sellars would be to argue that his account of picturing depends on 
linguistic objects correctly picturing non-linguistic objects. This would involve 
regarding the links they bring about from a normative semantical point of view 
and not just as elements in the natural order. Sellars might argue that to say 
that a linguistic object correctly pictures a nonlinguistic object is not a 
normative matter, although normative language is used: corresponding to 
every espoused principle of correctness there is a matter-of factual uniformity 
in performance which link words with the objects they picture (compare 
Sellars (1962a, p. 222).  
As Sellars argues in “Truth and Correspondence” (1962b) the uniformity of 
our behavior is only brought about because our language use is rule-governed 
in the first place and thus only reflects that our linguistic actions are rule-
governed. Since picturing relations are established because of the uniformity 
of our linguistic behavior, such a view suggests that picturing relations depend 
on our language use being rule-governed. If this is correct, then picturing 
relations depend on conceptual capacities. And if an expression pictures an 
  
8 See, in particular, Sellars (1967a, III §66/p. 86). 
9 See also Sellars (1967a , IV §56/pp. 111-112): “If we know, for example, that  
‘Sage’s (in F) are •wise•s  
we know, by virtue of our knowledge of what ‘wise’s do in our language, that the French word 
‘sage’ must occur in uniformities involving both tokens of ‘sage’ and extra-linguistic objects. But 
the uniformities do not consist of tokens of ‘sage’ standing for wisdom, but are rather to be 
characterized as complex uniformities involving many configurations of many French words and 
forms of behavior, on the one hand, and, not wisdom, but wise people, on the other.” 
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object only because it is embedded in a complex framework of semantical 
relations, then picturing relations can secure that our language preserves the 
structure of what it is about only by presupposing conceptual capacities. Thus 
on Sellars’s view, conceptual capacities are not only dependent on picturing 
relations, our capacity to entertain picturing relations is in turn dependent on 
our conceptual capacities.  
Acknowledging such a mutual dependency between the two capacities fits 
smoothly with Sellars’s “psychological nominalism.” As Sellars elaborates in 
the so-called Myth of Jones in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” 
thoughts should be understood on the model of linguistic acts. We acquire 
conceptual capacities by acquiring linguistic competence.10 Furthermore, all 
exercises of conceptual capacities are a linguistic affair. What the Myth of 
Jones aims to show is that the idea of inner episodes is unproblematic, since 
we can model it on overt speech. Thus, operations of conceptual capacities are 
not limited to overt uses of language, although overt speech might be 
considered as the primary use of conceptual capacities. In this sense, Sellars 
understands language not as the expression, but as the medium of our thoughts 
(see for example Sellars 1979, p. 74). 
Sellars is aware that this position involves the danger of equating words 
with concepts. What is crucial is “the denial that there is any awareness of 
logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language” (1997, 
§31/p. 66). Everything that is philosophically significant about our capacities 
to have thoughts is, in other words, mirrored in what is significant in our 
capacity to be competent speakers of a language.  
So far I have argued that concepts, such as •cat•, involve not only 
inference rules but also application rules for *cat*. Saying that *Katze* is a 
•cat• does not only imply that it plays the same role in German that *cat* 
plays in English: it is also to say that a person who knows that *Katze* is a 
•cat• knows when to use the word to refer to cats. I have argued that even if 
one accepts that concepts involve application rules, Sellars’s account of 
conceptual roles is successful as relying solely on signification relations and 
picturing relations and thus not involving semantical relations between words 
and objects. Sellars’s non-atomistic semantics is, therefore, compatible with 
the idea that the functional roles determining the use of words are related to 
objective reality through application rules. But this still leaves open the 
  
10 Compare Sellars (1997, §58/p. 105): “the ability to have thoughts is acquired in the process of 
acquiring overt speech . . . only after overt speech is well established, can “inner speech” occur 
without its overt culmination.” 
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question of how particular objects figure in the content perception. I will 
address this more specific question in the next section.  
 
 
2. Relating Thoughts to Objects 
 
According to Sellars, the most striking change between Kant’s approach and 
that of his predecessors is his insistence “that the class of contents should be 
expanded to include individual contents, e.g. the content of an intuitive 
representing of this-cube,11 or the content Socrates, which, though an 
individual content, is not the content of an intuitive representing” (1967a, 
p. 60). It is not obvious how in the framework of Sellars’s conceptual role 
semantics we can think of ourselves as accommodating this Kantian insight 
and picking out particular objects in perception. More needs to be in play than 
the rules of application governing our use of expressions to understand what it 
means for a person to direct a thought towards this rather than that particular 
object. Addressing this question will bring together Sellars’s account of 
functional roles with his account of perception.12  
It will be helpful to look at some elements of Sellars’s reading of Kant to 
get a clearer view of the issue in question. There are two possible readings of 
Sellars on Kant that give a very different place to the role of sensations and 
  
11 ‘This-cube’ refers to an intuitive representation. Since these representations are not 
straightforwardly conceptual, it would be wrong to put ‘this-cube’ in dot-quotes. This should not 
be read as implying that they are non-conceptual representations, whatever that would be. 
12 In contrast to Sellars, Robert Brandom (1994, in particular, pp. 199-229) deals with the problem 
of singular thought in his version of a conceptual role semantics without appealing to any 
conception of experience. The empirical content of our perceptual judgments is explained by 
arguing that our responsive dispositions allow us to react to our environment in a reliable and 
differential manner. On Brandom’s view, reliable differential responsive dispositions allow us to 
make observation reports. Since observation reports are brought about by our dispositions, rather 
than being derived from inferences, they present us with non-inferential knowledge. Their content, 
however, is determined by their inferential role. Furthermore, for an observation report to count as 
knowledge the reporter must endorse the claim contained in the report. By taking these two 
additional requirements into account, Brandom argues that our reliable differential responsive 
dispositions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for observational knowledge and, thus, 
distances himself from the kind of reliabilist approach taken, among others, by Alvin Goldman 
(1976 and 1986). By arguing that the reliability of our differential responsive dispositions is not 
assessed by the perceiving subject, but rather in an intersubjective context, Brandom deals with 
skeptical worries that Sellars’s account faces. The question remains whether such an account can 
explain how we can direct our thought at this rather than that particular object in perception, but it 
would lead too far a field to discuss this question here.  
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intuitions in perception. I will argue against what I will call an empiricist 
reading of the sensible conditions of perception and embrace what I will call a 
transcendental reading. 
In Science and Metaphysics, Sellars reads Kant as allowing solely for 
semantical relations between conceptual episodes, and consequently takes 
Kant to be struggling with the problem of how our thoughts are guided by the 
objects they are about, ensuring that our conceptual order is not arbitrary or 
haphazard. The following passage brings out the elements of Sellars’s reading 
of Kant with which I will be concerned:  
 
[W]hen [Kant] speaks of the productive imagination as “taking up” (A 120) the 
manifold of outer sense into its activity . . . the metaphor implies . . . that the 
manifold is an independent factor which has a strong voice in the outcome. On 
the other hand, it is only if the manifold is mistakenly construed as belonging to 
the conceptual order that it makes sense to suppose that it, so to speak, bodily or 
literally becomes a part of the resulting intuitive representation. If it is, as I take 
it to be, non-conceptual, it can only guide “from without” the unique conceptual 
activity which is representing of this-suches as subjects of perceptual judgment. 
(1967a, I §34/p. 16) 
 
Sellars’s guiding question in the first chapter of Science and Metaphysics is 
how perceptions of objects can yield knowledge. He explains how our 
thoughts are directed at objects by appealing to sense impressions, that is, 
mental states that are not shaped by the understanding. What seems clear is 
that perception about objective reality must involve representations that are 
brought about in a passive manner by having objects in view. The problem is 
that if these representations are considered to be conceptually formed, it is 
unclear how they can be thought of as constraining our conceptual framework. 
If, on the other hand, they are considered to be non-conceptual representations, 
it is not clear how they can guide at all. Such a view seems to imply that they 
(causally) determine our responses and determining a response is not the same 
thing as guiding a response. Sellars presents Kant as saying that sensibility 
guides the conceptual realm by “sheer receptivity,” thereby yielding non-
conceptual sense impressions. Since Sellars argues that there cannot be direct 
semantical relations between words and objects, he turns to “purely passive 
representations of receptivity” as what constrains the conceptual activity.13  
  
13 I profited from John McDowell’s Woodbridge Lectures (1998b) while thinking through this 
part of Sellars’s writing. I am not concerned here with the question of the immediacy of the 
presentness of objects to the intuitionally structured consciousness, which is central for 
McDowell’s criticism of Sellars’s reading of Kant. McDowell spells out a transcendental role for 
sensibility in terms of the immediate presence of objects to the conceptually shaped sensory 
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On what one could call an empiricist understanding of the sensible 
conditions of perception, “sheer receptivity” brings about representations that 
are not as yet conceptually shaped on the basis of which we form conceptual 
representations. This view can be found in Sellars when he complains that 
Kant has two notions of intuition between which he fails to distinguish clearly. 
According to Sellars, one notion accounts for the non-conceptual impact that 
guides our representations “from without,” while the other accounts for the 
role of perception in understanding. He writes  
 
[I]t is clear that Kant applies the term ‘intuition’ to both the representations 
which are formed by the synthesizing activity of the productive imagination and 
the purely passive representations of receptivity which are the “matter” 
(A86/B108) which the productive imagination takes into account.14 (1967a, I 
§18/p. 7) 
 
Sometimes, Sellars refers to the former as intuitions and to the latter as sense 
or sense impressions, distinguishing the “guidedness of intuition” from the 
“receptivity of sense.” In other passages, he speaks of “the conceptual 
character of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition” and “the radically 
non-conceptual character of sense” (1967a, I §40/p. 16). For reasons that will 
become clear in due time, I will refer to the former as intuitions and to the 
latter as sensations.  
I will argue that Kant’s notion of intuition in no way conflates two different 
kinds of representations. Granted, Kant opens the Critique of Pure Reason by 
distinguishing two different sources of knowledge – understanding and 
sensibility – and then speaks of concepts and intuitions as corresponding to 
these two sources of knowledge, thereby suggesting that intuitions are 
  
consciousness of thinkers. On this reading, thoughts are about things in the real order because 
objects are immediately present to conceptual consciousness in intuition. By suggesting a 
relational understanding of intentionality, he can argue that “nonsheer receptivity is operative in 
intuition” and thereby undermine the threat of idealism with which Sellars’s project is confronted. 
McDowell goes along with Sellars insofar as he argues that conceptual episodes differ 
intrinsically. But by taking the immediacy of intuitional representations into account, he takes a 
different approach than Sellars, arguing that conceptual episodes differ intrinsically, not in a way 
that systematically corresponds to what they are about, but because the difference in what they are 
directed towards is itself an intrinsic difference in conceptual episodes. 
14 Shortly before this passage Sellars writes: “Kant’s use of the term ‘intuition’, in connection 
with human knowledge, blurs the distinction between a special sub-class of conceptual 
representations of individuals which, though in some sense a function of receptivity, belong to a 
framework which is in no sense prior to but essentially includes general concepts, and a radically 
different kind of representation of an individual which belongs to sheer receptivity and is in no 
sense conceptual.” 
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non-conceptual. But this reading becomes unintelligible in light of Kant’s 
argument in the Transcendental Analytic. Kant there shows how the picture 
drawn in the Aesthetic is too simplistic, arguing that intuitions can only be 
grasped in the context of a judgment and thus cannot be understood as 
non-conceptual representations. The simplistic dualistic picture with which 
Kant opens the first Critique can be seen as a rhetorical move that allows him 
to gain the sympathy of his contemporary readers. Kant does, however, have a 
notion of sensations, which on the reading of Sellars I aim to defend can be 
seen as corresponding to what Sellars means when he speaks of sense 
impressions.15  
According to Sellars, sensations yield non-conceptual representations of 
the real order, whereas intuitions conceptually represent the object. The purely 
passive manner in which sensations are brought about guarantees that 
intuitions are of the objects the perceiving person takes them to be of. 
Sensations are thus necessary for guaranteeing the objectivity of our 
conceptual representations. 
What does it mean to say that non-conceptual sensations guide our 
perceptual judgments? On what I have called an empiricist understanding of 
the sensible conditions of perception, we first have basic mental 
representations that are not as yet apperceived, on the basis of which we arrive 
at conceptual representations. The notion of sensations involved in such a view 
is problematic in that it raises the question of what representational status 
sensations should have. More importantly, such representations are subject to 
the very same objections that Sellars raises against the sense-data view.16 On 
such a view, sensations are intermediaries that allow us to form conceptual 
representations of the objects in view. Sensations and the conceptual capacities 
which they feed into are understood on the model of a scheme-content 
dualism, meaning that we have conceptual resources that are void of content, 
on the one hand, and are able to grasp empirical content that does not have any 
conceptual structure, on the other. The conceptual scheme is considered to be 
abstracted (or abstractable) from the sensory content, and the sensory content 
is considered to be given and in some way accessible to us independently of 
  
15 In the following, I will always speak of sensations to stick to a more standard translation of 
Kant’s ‘sinnliche Eindrücke’ or ‘Empfindungen’.  
16 I will not recapitulate these objections here. They have been discussed in detail and with 
different outlooks by Robert Brandom (1995 and in his study guide to Sellars in 1997), Willem 
deVries (2000), John McDowell (1995 and 2002), and Jay Rosenberg (2000, 2002, and 2003), 
among others. 
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the concepts we use to form judgments.17 The picture suggests that we start 
with a scheme and a content and only in a second step bring the two together 
to form a conceptual representation. It is unclear on such a reading of 
sensations, why sensations are not a version of the given that Sellars criticizes. 
Whatever Sellars meant with his appeal to sensations, it must have been 
something subtler. I will argue that one can find in Sellars a very different 
view than the one that emerges from what I have called the empiricist 
understanding of sensations. Shortly after introducing his notion of sensations 
in Science and Metaphysics, Sellars argues that  
 
[t]heir “receptivity” is a matter of the understanding having to cope with a 
manifold of representations characterized by “receptivity” in a more radical 
sense, as providing the “brute fact” or constraining element of perceptual 
experience.  
The latter manifold has the interesting feature that its existence is postulated on 
general epistemological or, as Kant would say, transcendental grounds, after 
reflection on the concept of human knowledge as based on, though not 
constituted by, the impact of independent reality. It is postulated rather than 
“found” by careful and discriminating attention. The concept of such a manifold 
is, in contemporary terms, a theoretical construct. (p. 9) 
 
Sellars states here that he wants to understand sensations as “theoretical 
constructs.” In “Some Reflections on Perceptual Consciousness” Sellars makes 
a similar point when he contends that sensations “are not yielded by 
phenomenological reduction, but postulated by a proto-(scientific)-theory” 
(1977b, p. 179), arguing that to have a sensation of a pink cube “is not to sense 
something as a cube of pink, though it is a state postulated by a theory 
designed to explain what it is to see (or seem to see) a cube of pink as a cube 
of pink” (p. 181). Here sensations are not thought of as unapperceived 
representations on which perceptions are based, but rather as that which we 
must assume figures in our perception if we think of them as being about 
objective reality. Symptomatically, Sellars uses the words ‘epistemological’ 
  
17 The scheme-content dualism that Donald Davidson (1974) argues against has been interpreted 
in various other ways. The scheme has been understood as a system of concepts, an equivalence 
class of intertranslatable languages, a theory, and a worldview. Similarly, the content has been 
understood as everything from objects, events, sense data, to Quinean stimulations. The 
plausibility of Davidson’s argument rises and falls depending on how these different 
interpretations of the scheme and the content are combined. Some combinations do not amount to 
a dualism at all. I thank Anil Gupta for making me aware of this fact. The argument I wish to 
bring out against the scheme-content dualism is general enough that it will not be necessary to 
address the various possible interpretations of Davidson’s argument.  
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and ‘transcendental’ synonymously when he discusses the role of sensations in 
perception (1967a, I §22/p. 9 and §28/p. 11). The idea suggested is that we 
must assume that there is something given that figures in our perception, if we 
want to think of our perception as yielding knowledge of objective reality, that 
is, of objects as existing independently of our mental capacities.  
This is the crucial insight of Sellars that I would like to hold on to. 
Understanding sensations in this second way is to see the role of sensations in 
perception as a transcendental condition of perception rather than as a 
primitive building stone in an empiricist framework. By contrast to the 
empiricist understanding, sensations can now be understood as something 
other than intermediaries between our conceptual thoughts and the objective 
reality we perceive, or alternatively between the causal impact and the 
conceptual outcome of perception.  
Such an understanding of sensations is much closer to the Kantian notion 
of Empfindungen or sinnliche Eindrücke. On a Kantian view, sensations are 
the matter of perception that we must assume figure in our perception.18 But 
the matter that is given in perception (sensation) is just one side of the 
sensibility of perception, the other side being its form (intuition). On such a 
view, the distinction between intuitions and sensations is not understood as 
one between conceptual and non-conceptual representations or between two 
kinds of representation understood in any other way, but rather as a distinction 
between form and matter. Kant does not allow for the possibility of sensations 
independently of their role in perception and, thus, independently of their role 
in empirical intuitions. Sensations and intuitions necessarily come together and 
in this sense are just two sides of one coin. In this sense, Sellars’s talk in 
Science and Metaphysics of sensations as that which is given, the matter of 
experience, does not invoke speaking of the given as Sellars attacks it. 
But why are intuitions not candidates for the given?19 No doubt, Kant 
understands intuitions as representations that fulfill the role of linking thoughts 
to objects, thereby providing a possibility for judgments and, in contrast to 
sensations, he thinks of intuitions as mental representations proper. 
Nonetheless, intuitions are not intelligible in isolation either. The content of 
intuitions is only accessible to us in the context of a judgment. Although 
intuitions are related to an object independently of their role in empirical 
  
18 See for instance Kant ([1781] 1965) A20/B34, A42/B59-60, A167/B209 or A218/B266. I 
follow the usual practice in referring to passages in the Critique of Pure Reason by citing the 
pagination of the original editions, indicated by A for the 1781 edition, and B for the 1787 edition. 
19 For the sake of ease of formulation, I will speak just of intuitions in the following passages, but 
it should be kept in mind that empirical intuitions and sensations always go together.  
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judgments (intuitions are related immediately to objects), we can only have a 
grasp on their content if they figure in a propositional representation.  
How does this bear on the question of how we can direct our thoughts at 
particular objects? Kant argues, on the one hand, that we can direct thoughts at 
something particular only when an object is given to us in intuition. On the 
other hand, he says that intuitions are not enough to have knowledge, 
“properly so called,” of objects (A78/B103). In other words, the immediate 
representation we have in intuition is not enough to recognize an object. These 
two lines of thought can be brought together in light of Kant’s understanding 
of concepts as universally applicable rules that can serve as predicates of 
possible judgments. As rules of synthesis, concepts determine intuitions. 
Accordingly, intuitional representations are what we grasp when a rule of 
synthesis is applied to the sensible manifold. Kant’s metaphor of intuitions 
falling under concepts or being subsumed under concepts can be understood 
along these lines. The talk of subsumption of intuitions under a concept need 
not be understood as implying that intuitions are independently intelligible 
representations that we in a second step recognize as falling under a particular 
concept. Nor should subsumption be interpreted as suggesting that intuitions 
are recognized as having a common property that the concept stands for. The 
point is rather that we can identify the content of an intuition only as a result of 
applying a rule.20  
On the reading of Kant I would like to urge, we presuppose intuitive 
representations when we make judgments about an object. We thereby 
subsume the intuitive representation under an empirical concept and thus bring 
about a conceptual representation. In this sense, we can only retrospectively 
say (when we analyze a judgment) that the intuition in the judgment is the 
immediate representation of an object, but we cannot have knowledge properly 
so-called of an object by means of an intuition alone. 
  
20 Thus, I am suggesting to read Kant on different lines than Manley Thompson (1972), who 
writes: “It is thus possible to regard an empirical intuition as in a sense knowledge, and to speak of 
it as blind without concepts because only as unified through concepts can it become knowledge 
properly so called” (p. 323). According to Thompson, we can have blind empirical intuitions that 
provide us with a preliminary form of knowledge, yielding knowledge proper only when 
combined with concepts. The main problem with this view is that it remains unclear what it is that 
we grasp or represent with an intuition if the intuition is not subsumed under concepts. On 
Thompson’s view, intuitions are representations the content of which we have access to 
independently of their role in judgments. On such a view, intuitions just are a form of the given as 
Sellars criticizes it.  
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Concepts as general representations become singular in the context of a 
judgment by subsuming an intuition under them.21 On such a reading, it 
becomes unproblematic to see intuitions as picking out objects immediately 
towards which thoughts are directed only mediately. Thus, although in 
perception we are affected by an object and, in this sense, it is not up to us 
what our perceptions are about, this does not imply that we can grasp the 
content of intuitional representations outside of the context of a judgment. In 
this sense, Sellars’s talk of intuitions does not involve speaking of the given as 
he attacks it any more than his notion of sensations involves speaking of the 
given.22 
I have argued that the role of sensibility is to account for how it is that we 
can understand our perceptions as being about objective reality. On Kant’s 
picture these sensible conditions are twofold: The matter given in perception, 
sensation, and its form, intuition. On what I have called an empiricist 
understanding, intuitions are epistemically graspable prior to being embedded 
in propositional representations. By contrast, on a transcendental 
understanding, the content of intuitions is only graspable when brought under 
concepts in a judgment, even though intuitions are what in a judgment link us 
to the object that the judgment is about.23 While intuitions are not graspable 
independently of being subsumed under concepts in the context of a judgment, 
  
21 In “Particulars,” Sellars introduces a notion of basic particulars that integrates both a “this-
factor” (accounting for the particularity of a perceptual representations) and a “such-factor” 
(accounting for their generality). In Naturalism and Ontology (1979), he uses this same notion of 
basic particulars to play the role of the “medium of alteration” in his process ontology. For an 
excellent study of Sellars’s process ontology, see Seibt (1990). 
22 I am taking a different line than William Alston (2002), who argues that Sellars’s critique of the 
“Myth of the Given” is incompatible with the view that there is a non-conceptual mode of 
“presentation” or “givenness” of particulars that is the heart of sense perception. By contrast, I am 
arguing that a Sellarsian approach is committed to the view that there is something given in 
perception, but it is only accessible to us if we bring our rational capacities to bear on what is 
given. Speaking of something being given in perception need to involve speaking of non-
conceptual content. I take the view of perception that Alston endorses to be much closer to 
Sellars’s own account than Alston makes it out to be. I am arguing, however, that it is misleading 
to think of the central distinction for a Sellarsian approach in terms of conceptual and non-
conceptual content. What must be distinguished are rather the elements accounting for the 
singularity and generality of perception, on the one hand, and the form and matter involved in 
perception, on the other. 
23 This way of thinking about intuitions is influenced by Gareth Evans’s (1982) discussion of 
information links. On Evans’s view, our ability to relate to an object is dependent not only on our 
ability to receive information about the world, but also on our ability to act in the world. Although 
I focus only on the thought-dependency of perception in this paper, I take its dependency on 
action to be at least as important. 
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sensations in their role as the matter for perception of objects are not graspable 
independently of being formed into empirical intuitions. Intuitions and 
sensations just are the conditions without which we cannot think of ourselves 
as having perceptions about objective reality. As will become clearer in the 
next section, the central distinction for a Sellarsian approach should not be 
understood as one between non-conceptual and conceptual representations, but 
rather as between the elements of empirical judgments that account for their 
generality (concepts) and the elements that account for their singularity, the 
latter involving both form (intuition) and matter (sensation). 
 
 
3. Intuitions and Demonstratives 
 
Now, Sellars interprets intuitions on the model of demonstratives, and thus 
understands locutions such as ‘that cube’ as providing the linkage to objects 
perceived. ‘That cube’ is a way of picking up Kant’s phrasing that intuitions 
are immediately of objects (A68/B93). Here again I would like to distinguish 
two different ways of reading Sellars. On the face of it, understanding 
intuitions on the model of demonstratives should strike one as puzzling: ‘That 
cube’ is a singular use of concepts, however, empirical intuitions are not a 
basic kind of conceptual activity, but rather the sensible condition for the 
empirical use of concepts. 
No doubt, when our thought is directed at a particular object in perception, 
we give a concept a singular use. But intuitional content is not a fragment of 
the content we form in perceptual judgments, but rather a necessary condition 
for such judgments. For whatever it is worth, Kant is very explicit that it is 
concepts that are used in a singular, general, or universal manner, and that a 
singular use of concepts is not the same as an intuition.24 While it is the 
intuition that picks out the object in view, it is the concept that determines our 
understanding of the object. The content of intuitional representations must 
therefore not be understood in analogy with the content of conceptual 
representations. Indeed, the distinction between intuitions and concepts need 
not be understood in terms of their content at all. What are distinguished are 
rather the manners in which the representations refer to what they are about. 
While intuitions refer immediately and account for the singularity of 
  
24 See Kant ([1800] 1992, §1, Note 2): “It is a mere tautology to speak of concepts as general or 
universal; a mistake that rests on an improper division of concepts into general, particular, and 
singular. Not concepts themselves but only their use [Gebrauch] can be so divided.” 
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perceptual judgments, concepts refer mediately by subsuming an intuition 
under them.  
Intuitions are involved whenever thought is directed at objective reality. 
Understanding intuitions as fragments of judgments would just be to 
understand intuitions as a product of receptivity that makes a separable 
contribution to the perceptual judgments we form when having an object in 
view. Such a view would fall prey to the very same objections that Sellars 
raises against the sense-data view. Therefore, Sellars must be after something 
else when he understands intuitions as having a demonstrative form. 
If we think of intuitions as being a necessary condition for any perceptual 
judgment (demonstrative or not), we can understand intuitions as providing for 
the possibility of perceptual judgment. Another way of expressing this idea is 
that intuitions provide us with invitations to judgments or that intuitions are 
“petitions for judgments” – to use Robert Brandom’s (2002) wording. On such 
a view, intuitions are conceptual representations that potentially find verbal 
expression in perceptual statements when subsumed under concepts. When 
looking at a white wall, we can abstract from unimportant details and can 
correctly judge the wall as white. Given the circumstances, it might also be 
correct to say that parts of the wall appear green and pink and that the corners 
have a brownish tint. The two judgments only seem to be incompatible: 
although they are about the same object, they refer to different levels of detail. 
In an analogous way every situation of perception brings about different 
possible perceptual judgments. Indeed, one might want to say that when a 
perceiver has something in view there is an open-ended string of possible 
demonstrative propositions that she is invited to form.  
One might object that such a view invokes a superfluous and potentially 
problematic intermediary stage in perception, namely, a stage in which we 
make a choice of what we direct our attention to. When a person perceives a 
tree swaying in the wind, she might not be aware of its many leaves fluttering 
in the wind: It is tempting to say that she is not perceptually aware of the 
leaves fluttering in the wind, because her attention is not directed at the leaves. 
But saying that intuitions only provide for the possibility for judgments need 
not mean that in perception we make a choice of what we direct our attention 
to. When we perceive a tree swaying in the wind, we might not be aware of its 
many leaves fluttering in the wind, but that is not to say that the content of our 
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perception does not represent the leaves fluttering in the wind. One might want 
to say that we have not made this content explicit.25  
It certainly is not the case that we actively decide to direct our attention to 
this or that in perception: We do not look out of the window, assess the 
situation, the many possible judgments we could form, and decide to direct our 
attention to this or that. We do not decide on what we pay attention to, rather 
we find ourselves directing our attention to this or that. Only when we have 
already distinguished possible different ways of perceiving an object (say 
when we have become aware that it is both correct to say that the wall is white 
and to say that it appears to have patches of pink and green) that we can think 
of ourselves as choosing to perceive it in this or that way. But to say that there 
is a choice about what we direct our attention to, is not to say that in 
perception we make a choice about what we direct our attention to. It is in this 
sense that perception is passive: We find ourselves perceiving this or that. This 
is how one can read Sellars interpretation of intuitions as having the form 
“that . . . ” without thinking of intuitions as being primitive mental 






Sellars understands the word *cube* to be at the same time semantically 
classified by the functional role in virtue of which a *cube* is a •cube• and to 
be picturing an object, namely a cube, at least in the veridical case. As I argued 
in the previous section, the application rules involved in •cube•, can be seen as 
setting up the mapping relation between *cube*s and actual cubes. This is not 
enough, however, to explain how it is that we can direct our thought at this 
rather than that particular cube in perception. On Sellars’s view, our ability to 
refer to particular objects depends on individual links between judgments and 
the objects the judgments are about. There are two sides to such a subject 
matter: The matter given in perception (sensation), and its form (intuition). On 
  
25 Indeed we might want to say be that we perceive the tree swaying in the wind, because we see 
the leaves fluttering in the wind. The idea underlying this thought is the same idea that motivates 
Leibniz’s distinction between grandes and petites representings. On Leibniz’s view our perception 
of a the ocean roaring, to use his example, is constituted of a multitude of micro perceptions of the 
noise that a grain of sand makes when water crashes on it. We are not aware of the noise that 
every single grain of sand makes when listening to the roaring of the ocean. Nonetheless, we hear 
the roaring of the ocean because we hear the noise of many grains of sand. 
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an empiricist understanding, intuitions and sensations are epistemically 
graspable prior to a concrete propositional representation. I argue that it is 
unclear on such a view why sensations and intuitions are not just versions of 
the given as Sellars criticizes it. By contrast, on a transcendental understanding 
the role of sensibility is to account for how it is that we can understand our 
perceptions as being about objective reality. Intuitions and sensations are what 
we must assume figure in our perception if we think of our perception as 
having a subject matter. Intuitions and sensations necessarily go together in 
perception of objective reality. While sensations are not graspable 
independently of being formed into empirical intuitions, the content of 
intuitions is not graspable independently of being subsumed under concepts in 
the context of a judgment. On such a view it is unproblematic to see sensations 
as what is given in perception: They are not intelligible independently of their 
role as the matter of intuitions, the content of which is accessible to us only in 
the context of a judgment. 
One might want to insist on saying that such sensations have 
non-conceptual content. In the contemporary philosophical context, it is, 
however, misleading to use the phrase, unless the content in question is 
understood to be accessible to the perceiving subject without bringing any 
conceptual capacities into play. Although Sellars speaks of sensations as 
having non-conceptual content, he is very explicit that the content provided 
with sensibility is graspable by the perceiver only in the context of a judgment. 
If intuitions can mean nothing to us unless we bring our conceptual capacities 
to bear on them, it is just as misleading to say that they are conceptual 
representations as it is to see them as non-conceptual representations when 
isolated from their role in judgments. The conceptual/non-conceptual 
distinction, thus, does not bring us far in a discussion of the sensible conditions 
of perception understood in the way I have presented. The crucial distinctions 
in play are between the form and matter of the sensible conditions of 
perception as well as the manner in which intuitional and conceptual 
representations refer to an object: While intuitions account for the singularity 
of perceptual judgments, the concepts in play account for their generality. As I 
argued, this is compatible with understanding conceptual activity as 
constrained by that towards which it is intentionally directed. Indeed, only by 
allowing that thoughts are about something can the transcendental requirement 
that conceptual activity is intentionally directed towards something be met. In 
contrast to the empiricist understanding, sensations and intuitions are not 
understood as intermediaries between our conceptual thoughts and the 
objective reality we perceive, but rather as the conditions without which we 
cannot think of ourselves as having empirical knowledge.  
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